Support for an extremist entity such as Islamic State (ISIS) somehow manages to survive globally online despite significant external pressure, and may ultimately inspire acts by individuals who have no prior history of extremism, formal cell membership or direct links to leadership. We uncover an ultrafast ecology driving this online support and provide a mathematical theory that describes it. The ecology features self-organized aggregates that proliferate preceding the onset of recent real-world campaigns, and adopt novel adaptive mechanisms to enhance their survival. One of the actionable predictions is that the development of large, potentially potent pro-ISIS aggregates can be thwarted by targeting smaller ones.
Extremist entities such as ISIS (known as Islamic State) stand to benefit from the global reach and speed of the Internet for propaganda and recruiting purposes, in ways that were unthinkable for their predecessors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) . This increased connectivity may not only facilitate the formation of realworld cells that subsequently carry out violent attacks (e.g. the ISIS-directed attacks in Paris, November 2015) but may also inspire self-radicalized actors with no known prior history of extremism or links to extremist leadership, to operate without actually belonging to a cell (e.g. the ISIS-inspired attack in San Bernardino, December 2015) (11) . Recent research has used records of attacks to help elucidate cell structure in past organizations in which the Internet was not a key component (3, 6, 12) , the nature of attacks by lone-wolf actors (13) and the relationship between general Internet buzz and real-world events (14) (15) (16) . However this leaves open the question of how support for an entity like ISIS develops online prior to any real-world cell necessarily being formed, or any real-world attack perpetrated --whether by 'recruits' or those simply 'inspired'. This paper offers fresh insight into how robust online support for Internet-savvy extremist entities can emerge as a result of self-organization and adaptation, and without the need of any realworld cells or attacks to have yet been identified. Having discussed our datasets and the emergence of aggregates, we provide a mathematical theory that describes quantitatively the online support dynamics at the systems level, as well as identifying novel adaptive strategies that have evolved at the level of individual aggregates. Our analysis provides operationally relevant quantitative predictions about the evolution of such online support and how its development can be thwarted. SM (Supplementary Material) Sec. 1 provides a roadmap linking the paper to supporting material.
Our datasets comprise detailed second-by-second longitudinal records of online support activity for ISIS from its 2014 development onwards and, for comparison, online civil protestors across multiple countries within the past three years following the U.S. Open Source Indicator (OSI) project (14) (15) (16) . SM Sec. 2 has detailed data descriptions and sample file downloads. The data shows that operational pro-ISIS and protest narratives are mitigated through self-organized online aggregates, each of which is an ad hoc group of followers of an online page created through Facebook or its global equivalents such as ВКонтакте (VKontakte) at www.vk.com (Fig. 1) . These generic web-based interfaces allow such aggregates to form in a language-agnostic way, and with freely chosen names that help attract followers without publicizing their members' identities (SM Sec. 2). Pro-ISIS aggregates inhabit a multi-predator online environment with entities such as police cyber-groups, individual hackers and website moderators seeking to shut down pro-ISIS activity (17, 18) . In contrast to the largely mundane chatter that may casually mention ISIS on Twitter and in aggregates focused on sport, for example, the pro-ISIS aggregates that we quantify discuss operational details such as routes for financing, technological know-how and avoiding drone strikes. SM Sec. 3 illustrates this explicit pro-ISIS material. We chose VKontakte for our pro-ISIS analysis since (i) pro-ISIS aggregates are shutdown essentially immediately on Facebook, but not on VKontakte; (ii) it is the largest European online social networking service with more than 360 million users; (iii) it allows multiple languages and is used worldwide; (iv) being based in Russia, it has a high concentration of users of Chechen origin focused in the Caucasus region near ISIS' main area of influence in the Levant; (v) it has proven to be a popular tool for ISIS propaganda within the Russianspeaking population (2). Our methodology for identifying these pro-ISIS aggregates is: (1) The subject-matter co-authors start by manually identifying relevant narratives using hashtags in multiple languages, e.g. #isn #khilafah #fisyria #игиш (i.e. ISIS) #дауля (i.e. dawla, meaning 'state') #халифат (i.e. 'Caliphate'), and trace these to underlying aggregates, e.g. fi sabilillah (i.e. 'in the cause of Allah'). (2) Though labor intensive, we were able to find closure on a daily basis in real time. A similar process is followed for the civil protest data (SM Sec. 2).
We uncovered 196 pro-ISIS aggregates involving 108,086 individual followers between January 1 and August 31 2015. On any given day, the total number of follows in the followeraggregate network (i.e. total number of links from followers (blue nodes) to aggregates (red nodes) in Fig. 1 inset) ranged up to 134,857. The network has a highly complex temporal evolution with strong heterogeneity in both the number of follows per individual follower (i.e. the number of links emanating from a given blue node) and the number of follows per aggregate (i.e. the number of links entering a given red node, which we define as the aggregate's size); and no obvious hierarchical structure which suggests that the follower-aggregate dynamics are driven by self-organization. Such online support is likely a necessary but not sufficient condition for any real-world actions to subsequently take place, since many additional factors can hinder real-world execution. However (20) with the divergence date ! matching the actual onset almost exactly. The connection to physical phase transitions again suggests selforganization is a driving factor (20) . While such a divergence will not necessarily pre-empt attacks involving only a few individuals such as in San Bernardino or Paris, it can help indicate an alignment of favorable conditions and has the advantage that it does not rely on any real-world events having yet occurred or likely dates having being circulated through social media in advance (14) (15) (16) . The far longer lifetimes for online aggregates of protestors in Fig. 2B as compared to pro-ISIS aggregates in Fig. 2A , makes sense since predatory online shutdown pressure was far less for the civil protestorsin particular, we found no evidence of any shutdowns in Fig. 2B , in stark contrast to Fig. 2A . Figure  2D We now develop a systems level theory of this online aggregate ecology. Distinctive shark-fin shapes (Fig. 3A) characterize the empirical aggregate size variation, with each sporadic shutdown of a pro-ISIS aggregate severing the links into that particular aggregate (red node in Fig. 1 inset) , hence the abrupt drop. This fragmentation co-exists with self-organized coalescence by which individual followers sporadically link into existing aggregates while existing aggregates sporadically link into each other. While each aggregate's precise shark-fin shape will depend on its content and noticeability to external predators, Figure 3 shows that the system-level features are captured using only this minimal coalescence-fragmentation process. At each timestep, a phenomenological probability coal describes the sporadic addition of 1,2,3,… etc. follows to an aggregate at each timestep (coalescence of follows) while frag describes the sporadic sudden shutdown of an aggregate (fragmentation of follows). Such stochastic shutdown is realistic since the predators (e.g. government monitors, individual hackers) are largely independent entities and can only shutdown aggregates that they happen to find. Larger aggregates should be more noticeable, hence we can take the probability of a particular aggregate being picked for coalescence or targeted for shutdown as proportional to the aggregate's size (21) though this is generalizable to other algebraic forms without affecting our main findings (SM Sec. 5). The total number of potential follows N in the system is a sum, over all potential followers, of the maximum number of aggregates that each follower is prepared to follow. The number of follows per individual can be heterogeneous, and follows can remain unused at any timestep. Computer simulations of this coalescence-fragmentation process (Fig. 3B) reproduce the ecology of shark-fin shapes of all sizes (Fig. 3) with a power-law distribution !! for the timeaverage number of aggregates of size where = 2.5. This is similar to the empirical value of = 2.33 that has high goodness-of-fit = 0.86 (Fig. 3C) . These shark-fin dynamics are robust in that they emerge irrespective of when we examine the model's evolution (Fig. 3B) and for any value of N, as a result of the model's self-similarity. Connecting to real-world ISIS activity, we note that the severity of ISIS attacks is also approximately power-law distributed with exponent = 2.43 and goodness-of-fit > 0. 1 (22) . The model can be represented mathematically by the following coupled, nonlinear differential equations describing the number ! of pro-ISIS aggregates of size s ( > 1) over time:
A detailed discussion of Eq. (1) is given in SM Sec. 5. Like the data and our simulation, solving Eq.
(1) mathematically yields a power-law !! for the time-averaged aggregate size, with an exact exponent = 2.5 (see Refs. 23 and 24 for proof). The spatial independence of Eq. (1) is consistent with online interactions being largely independent of followers' separation across the globe. The first term on the right describes the formation of an aggregate of size s (i.e. s follows) from a smaller one through the addition of 1,2,3,.. etc. new follows; the second describes the loss of an aggregate that coalesced with another aggregate; and the third describes the fragmentation of an aggregate of size s. !!! ( ) is the pool of isolated (i.e. unused) follows at time t, i.e. potential 'recruits', with
. We take N to be reasonably slowly varying though this can be generalized (SM Sec. 5). Adding heterogeneity to the aggregate formation process (e.g. preference for similar or diverse follows) leaves the exponent = 2.5 unchanged, as do a variety of other generalizations (23,24) (SM Sec. 5).
Our theoretical model generates various mathematically rigorous yet operationally relevant predictions: (1) Anti-ISIS agencies can thwart development of large aggregates that are potentially far more potent (21), by breaking up smaller ones. As shown in Fig. 3D , adding a simple cost for shutting down an aggregate into the model makes this strategy actually more effective than targeting the largest aggregates (SM Sec. 6). (2) If anti-ISIS agencies are insufficiently active in countermeasures and hence the overall rate at which they fragment pro-ISIS clusters becomes too small, specifically if the aggregate fragmentation rate frag < ln !! , then pro-ISIS support will grow exponentially fast into one super-aggregate (SM Sec. 7). (3) More generally, when fragmentation rates drop below a critical value frag critical , the system enters a regime in which any piece of pro-ISIS material can spread globally across the pro-ISIS support network through contagion: frag critical = coal with p and q representing the probabilities of follower-to-follower transmission and follower recovery respectively (see Ref. 25 for proof). To prevent diffusion of potentially dangerous material and ideas, the fragmentation rate should be greater than coal . (4) Any online 'lone wolf' actor will only truly be alone for short periods of time, before being drawn into one aggregate or another. (5) A systems level tool emerges for detecting the future online emergence of new ISIS-like entities, which is to employ our methodology to check if a crude power-law distribution with near 2.5 begins to emerge for aggregate support surrounding a particular theme.
At a more microscopic level, the data reveals that pro-ISIS aggregates exhibit the ability to collectively adapt in a way that can extend their lifetime and increase their maximal size (Fig. 4) despite the fact that each aggregate is an ad-hoc group of followers who likely have never met, do not know each other, and do not live in the same city or country. For the civil protests, by contrast, we detected no such adaptations and no online predatory shutdowns, adding support to the notion that the pro-ISIS adaptions are a response to their high-pressured online environment. Figures 4A-C illustrate the remarkable speed, variety and novelty of these adaptations, with 15% of aggregates exhibiting name-changes; 7% exhibiting flips between online visibility (i.e. content open to any VKontakte user) and invisibility (i.e. content open only for followers of the aggregate); and 4% exhibiting reincarnation in which an aggregate disappears completely and then re-emerges at a later time with another identity but with most (e.g. >60%) of the same followers. Such reincarnation is not known to occur in real-world ecologies of living organisms. Figure 4D confirms these adaptations tend to increase not only the maximum number of followers attracted into the aggregate (maximum size) but also its lifetime. The 0.9 value for the reincarnation lifetime can be understood as follows: Reincarnation involves the aggregate temporarily disappearing, therefore an aggregate that uses reincarnation runs a high risk of losing followers since they do not know when, and with what name, the core follower group will re-emerge. Reincarnation hence tends to be used by aggregates that are attracting unusually high predation and would otherwise have had a much shorter lifetime. Reincarnation extends this lifetime beyond its otherwise much shorter value, but not enough to reach the value of 1 corresponding to aggregates that experience less intense shutdown pressure and hence do not employ adaptations. These observations open up the possibility to add evolutionary game theoretic features into our vanilla systems-level theory in order to explain the multiple use of particular adaptations by particular aggregates, and their decision of when to adapt. A future generalized theory could prove possible employing game theoretic ideas from Ref. 26 , for example.
More generally, our findings suggest that instead of having to analyze the online activities of many millions of individual potential actors worldwide (27) , interested parties can shift their focus to aggregates of which there will typically only be a few hundred. Our approach combining automated data-mining with subject-matter expert analysis and generative model building drawn from the physical and mathematical sciences, goes beyond existing approaches to mining such online data (28) (29) (30) . While recent reports (31) suggest that the amount of explicit pro-ISIS material online may have declined since summer 2015, it is possible that there is lower detection due to novel adaptations being employed --as in Fig. 4 but now likely more sophisticated. 
